I thank the Chair

and I thank my friend and colleague

from Arizona not only for yielding but

for his principal support of this legislation

and for his outstanding statement.

I rise to support the Iran Missile Proliferation

Sanctions Act and to thank

all of those in the Senate who have cosponsored

it, principally the distinguished

majority leader of the Senate

for his strong leadership in this effort.

It has been purposeful. It has been balanced.

I think it has been quite realistic.

I think we have before the Senate a

measured response to a real problem.

The real problem is the development by

Iran of ballistic missile capacity,

longer-range ballistic missile capacity,

which, when combined with attempts

within Iran to develop weapons of mass

destruction, holds the potential to

change the balance of power within the

Middle East.

It is destabilizing. It is threatening

to our troops and forces on the waters

within the Middle East region. It is

threatening to our allies within the

Arab world, moderate Arab nations.

And it is threatening to our ally,

Israel. That is in the short run.

In the longer run, the development of

longer-range ballistic missile capacity

by Iran could threaten our allies in Europe

in a wider circle around Iran and,

eventually, of course, could threaten us

directly here in the United States of

America. We are dealing here with a

very, very serious and concrete challenge

to world order and America’s national

security.

This measure has been introduced

and principally led by the majority

leader. I am privileged to have joined

with him in that. It is cosponsored by

more than 80 Members of the U.S. Senate—

84 is the total, I believe. It is in

that sense a profoundly bipartisan response

to this genuine national security

problem.

I think one of the reasons this measure

has gained the broad support that

it has is not only because the problem

is real, the threat to security from Iran

having long-range ballistic missile capacity

being real, but because the approach

taken in the bill is targeted.

I will go directly to the language of

the bill. ‘‘Sanctions shall be applied to

every foreign person with respect to

whom there is credible information indicating

that person’’—and of course

‘‘person’’ is given a broad definition of

a natural person —‘‘is an alien or a corporation,

business, association, partnership,

society, trust, or any other

nongovernmental entity, organization,

or group that is organized under the

laws of a foreign country or has its

presence, people, or place of business,

in a foreign country or any foreign governmental

entity operating as a business

enterprise in any successor or subsidiary

of any entity.’’

So this applies to any entity that

comes within that category, that first

transferred items on the MTCR, the

missile technology control regime

annex, or items that the United States

opposed for addition to that annex that

contributed to Iran’s efforts to acquire,

develop, or produce ballistic missiles.

We are talking here about entities

that are helping Iran gain the capacity

that I have described, as the Senator

from Arizona and the Senate majority

leader have all described, ‘‘to develop

ballistic missile capacity or provide

technical assistance or facilities which

the President deems to be of concern,

because of their direct contribution to

Iran’s efforts.’’ Again, to acquire or develop

ballistic missiles or attempt to

transfer such items or attempted to

provide technical assistance or facilities.

That is very direct. Apply sanctions

to entities that have actually done

something wrong, done something

wrong in the judgment of the President

of the United States as reported to

Congress every year regarding any

credible information that occurrences

by these entities have transpired to

help Iran gain the capacity that we do

not want them to gain.

That applies a series of sanctions in

response to that evidence, and gives

the President, incidentally, the authority

to waive those sanctions if he either

obtains additional information

that diminishes the content of the

original finding or the President determines

that the waiver is required, is essential,

to the national security of the

United States.

So, it is very targeted and not the

broad based, ‘‘don’t do any business

with this country or that country.’’

But on a finding of credible evidence by

the President of the United States that

a person, a company, a governmental

agency or institute has been assisting

Iran in obtaining ballistic missile capacity,

then these sanctions are applied

and the President may use a

waiver.

What are the sanctions? I will describe

them generally: stopping arms

sales under the Arms Export Control

Act to these entities; stopping the

transfer or sale of dual-use items under

the Export Administration Act; and

the cessation of any U.S. grants or

loans or other benefits to these entities.

Why should we be helping companies

or governmental agencies abroad that

are contributing to the development of

this Iranian ballistic missile capacity

which will so threaten our security?

So it is a very measured approach

which, again, I think is at the heart of

why this bill before us has over 80 percent

of the Senators supporting it, a

truly bipartisan measure.

Mr. President, there are those who

will say that things are changing in

Iran. So why pass this legislation?

Well, from the best that I can determine,

there are the beginnings of some

changes in Iran. The changes, certainly,

have not gone far enough to

alter the essential character of the center

of that regime, which is still fundamentally

hostile and threatening to

the United States and threatening to

our security. It is still the major sponsor,

state sponsor of terrorism in the

world which, to the best of our knowledge,

has resulted in the deaths of

many Americans and many citizens of

other countries that are allies of America.

Just the finding by the Argentinian

security, law enforcement forces

earlier this week announced—these are

tough cases to investigate—they have

traced two attacks, two bombings on

Jewish institutions in Argentina directly

back, by their judgment, just repeating

what I have read in the newspapers,

back to Iran. And so it goes.

So the election of the new President,

President Khatami, of Iran, who has

been making statements that are more

moderate, more open, both in terms of

Iran’s domestic policy and even international,

who gave the important

interview to CNN in which he suggested

the possibility of opening informal

contacts with the United States of

America, he still made some statements

that are extremely hostile and

negative toward us and some of our allies.

But, nonetheless, I take these to

be encouraging signs. But what remains

the fact, as best any of us can

determine, is that the much more radical

elements within the Iranian Government

are still in control of the apparatus

of that government—the military,

the intelligence, the foreign policy—

and, in fact, there is no indication

that any of the sponsorship of terrorism

has stopped.

In the meantime, the Senator from

Arizona has suggested, as we have

heard in classified briefings which cannot

be discussed in detail here, the Iranians

get ever closer to developing, in

a headlong thrust, full force, full-throttle

thrust, to developing long-range

ballistic missiles. Maybe it is going to

be hard to stop him from doing this.

But the intention of this bill, it seems

to me, is an exercise in common sense,

the exercise of traditional principles of

self-defense. This legislation will help

us to delay the date on which Iran will

achieve long-range ballistic missile capacity

with which it can deliver weapons

of mass destruction on those it

chooses as enemies, as targets.

Let’s think about it optimistically.

Perhaps in that period of time, we will

see a fruition of some of the obvious interests,

obvious concerns of the people

of Iran as expressed in the election of

Mr. Khatami for a change. I hope so.

The people of Iran have no inherent

reason—let me put it another way, Mr.

President. There is no inherent conflict

of interest, strategic interest between

the people of Iran and the people of the

United States. Unfortunately, since the

revolution that occurred in Iran in the

late 1970s, we have been set on a

confrontational course which threatens

the stability of the region and the

world and does nothing good for the

people of Iran —a gifted people with a

proud history.

So I am hopeful about the changes

that are possible within Iran, but, by

any reasoned judgment, we have a long

way to go yet. These missiles are being

developed rapidly and they are going to

be aimed at us and our allies. Therefore,

this proposal still seems to me to

be extremely important and, as I say,

very measured and targeted.

Mr. President, there are those who

say, well, OK, you are right, there is a

threat from Iran. But this measure is

really targeted at Russia. Not only is

there hope of change within Iran, but

there is even, of course, more substantial

change that has occurred, and the

hope of change, within the Russian

Government, particularly on this issue.

So why provoke the Russians? It is the

threat of these sanctions from Congress

that matters, not the realization

of it.

Let me say first, Mr. President, that

on the face of the bill, there is no mention

of Russia. This is a piece of legislation

that is targeted at any people,

any entities, any government, anywhere

on the globe that the President

has reason to believe is contributing to

Iran’s development and acquisition of

ballistic missile capacity. It could

apply to, and might in the past have

applied to, companies in allied countries

of ours in Western Europe who, in

one way or another, may have attempted

to sell or sold items to the Iranians,

which they have now used or are

using in the development of a ballistic

missile capacity, or even in the development

of weapons of mass destruction.

Certainly, some evidence suggests

that there may be entities within the

People’s Republic of China who have

transferred items, sold items to the

Iranians that are used in the development

of these threatening programs.

North Korea, our relations with them

are much more limited; nonetheless,

that is another possibility. But it is

true, to the best of our knowledge

today and in recent years—

I thank the Senator

for his extraordinary graciousness,

since we are in disagreement on

this particular question. Let me summarize

the remainder of my argument.

We know from intelligence sources,

some of which had been reported in the

press and referred to by the Senator

from Arizona, that in recent years, as

best we can determine, a number of

companies, institutes, and subdivisions

within Russia have been involved in

transactions, usually for business purposes,

with Iran, which are of material

technical assistance to Iran, to help in

their ballistic missile development program.

So, yes, this legislation will

apply to Russia.

We know this has been raised from

the highest level of our Government—

the Vice President, the National Security

Adviser, and others, like Ambassador

Frank Wisner and Mr. Gallucci,

with the Russians to end this cooperation

with Iran. Progress is being made.

On January 22, which I believe is the

exact date, former Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin issued an Executive

order in which he stated the intention

of the government to begin to set some

policies for trying to control this activity.

Within the last week, although I

don’t believe we have seen the details

of it in this country, the Russian Government

has promulgated a detailed series

of regulations to carry out

Chernomyrdin’s order of January of

this year. So there is a good-faith effort

being made at the governmental

level.

Yet, our intelligence sources—to

speak as broadly as I must in these

cases—tell us there is still evidence

that there are entities within Russia

that are continuing to cooperate with

Iran in the development of ballistic

missile capacity. That is why I think

we have to go ahead with this legislation

today. But why? I think it is very

important to say that it is not directed

at the Russian Government. In fact,

unless there is clear evidence of complicity

by the Russian Government in

one of these transfers, sanctions will

not go to the Russian Government.

They will go to companies, institutes,

or subdivisions. I hope our friends, in

return—particularly the new government

of Mr. Kiriyenko, the National

Security Adviser—to give him a title

he may not officially have—and the

deputy defense minister, Mr.

Kokoshin—will clearly understand that

this is not directed at them. In fact,

when we adopt the amendment to be

offered by the Senator from Michigan,

which will put the effective date of the

gathering of relevant evidence to the

date of the Chernomyrdin order in January,

then, I think, we will have a law

that basically says that America will

sanction entities within Russia that

are not complying with the clear policy

of the Russian Government.

In that sense, I think this is a very

important measure, one that will contribute

to our security, one that should

not affect our bilateral relations with

Russia, and one that could be the basis,

I hope in fact, for us going forward to

build a bilateral policy with Russia

that understands that the strategic reality

of the world has changed after the

cold war, and that we are no longer in

a situation of a bipolar world where

each of the great powers, the Soviet

Union and United States, are facing

each other with intercontinental ballistic

missiles and nuclear warheads,

and that we are working well together

to build down in our weapons through

the nuclear weapons, START I and

START II; but that each of us, Russia

and the United States, faces threats

from the proliferation of the possession

of weapons of mass destruction and the

world-changing capacity to deliver

those weapons with ballistic missiles.

So we ought to work together to try

to limit the spread of that technology

and the danger it will represent not

only to the United States and their allies

but to Russia and their allies.

I thank my colleagues for their support

of this bill and for giving me the

opportunity to speak to it today. I

hope that we will adopt it unanimously.

I look forward to seeing its implementation

and the increase in our

security in one of those areas that we

know will represent the greatest threat

in the generation ahead.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent

that an article from the January

1998 Reader’s Digest be printed in the

RECORD.

There being no objection, the article

was ordered to be printed in the

RECORD, as follows: